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THE NECESSITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IN
ESTABLISHING THE STANDARD OF CARE FOR
DESIGN PROFESSIONALS
Eugene J. Farrug*
Architects and engineers who work in the construction industry have
become increasingly popular targets for lawsuits.' This increased exposure is
due in part to the expansion of tort liability among all professions. 2 However,
developments specifically expanding the duties of design professionals3 and
* Mr. Farrug is a partner of the Chicago law firm of McKenna, Storer, Rowe, White &
Farrug.
1. In 1976, almost 30% of insured architectural or engineering firms were sued for
malpractice. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1978, § I, at 1, col. 1. "In 1985, there were 44 claims filed
for every 100 insured architecture firms: 'This justifies the architect's fear that, regardless of
the quality of his practice, there is a 50-50 chance he will be sued."' From Bauhaus to
Courthouse, 13 BARxR= 24 (1986) (quoting A. Abramowitz, Associate General Counsel,
American Institute of Architects). This increase in potential malpractice liability has resulted in
a corresponding increase in insurance premiums. See M. LUNCH, Forward to ARCHITECT AND
ENOIEER LIADILiTY: CIAms AGAIN sT DEsIGN PROFESSIONALS (T. Bottum & R. Cushman eds.
1987) (insurance premiums increased 80% between 1980 and 1985 while architecture and
engineering firms paid a larger part of their gross income for insurance in 1987 than just a few
years earlier-from 2-3% to 5.6%). See also Abramowitz, Professional Liability from the
Architect's Perspective, 17 GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVING PRACTICE, No. 3, at 1, 2 (1987) ("Between
1984 and 1985, the number of insurance companies offering design professional liability coverage
nationwide shrank from 13 to 2."); Coleman, Insurance Requirements in Construction Con-
tract-General Conditions as an Element of Professional Negligence, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 264,
268 (1979) (general contractors' insurance carriers generally refuse to issue riders naming design
professionals as additional insured parties due to their increasing liability).
2. See, e.g., Pelham v. Griesheimer, 92 II. 2d 13, 21, 440 N.E.2d 96, 100 (1982) (third-
party non-client may assert malpractice claim against attorney when client intends attorney's
efforts to directly benefit third party); Davis v. Weiskopf, 108 Ill. App. 3d 505, 510-12, 439
N.E.2d 60, 64-65 (2d Dist. 1982) (plaintiff may recover against physician who failed to warn
of serious knee injury even though defendant never treated nor medically advised plaintiff).
The duties of a design professional are often compared to those of lawyers and physicians.
See, e.g., Bayne v. Everham, 197 Mich. 181, 199-200, 163 N.W. 1002, 1008 (1917) ("the
responsibility of an architect does not differ from that of a lawyer or physician"); Swarthout
v. Beard, 33 Mich. App. 395, 401, 190 N.W.2d 373, 376 (1971) (architects, like physicians and
attorneys, must exercise skill and care common to profession), rev'd on other grounds, 388
Mich. App. 637 (1972). Cf. Rosos Litho Supply Corp. v. Hansen, 123 Ill. App. 3d 290, 295,
462 N.E.2d 566, 571 (1st Dist. 1984) (public expects architects, like other professionals, to
possess minimum level of special knowledge and ability). See generally Block, As the Walls
Came Tumbling Down: Architects' Expanded Liability Under Design-Build Construction Con-
tracting, 17 J. MARSHALL L. Ray. 1, 19 (1984) (like physicians and attorneys, design professionals
must exercise skilled judgment due to complex nature of profession).
3. For the purposes of this article "design professional" means an architect or an engineer
who designs or supervises construction projects. While there are other types of design profes-
sionals who may be sued for professional negligence, the overwhelming majority of cases involve
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the range of people to whom those duties are owed are the primary reasons
for the surge in the number of these suits.4 As design professionals' liability
has increased, it has triggered questions regarding the appropriate scope of
liability and, correspondingly, the methods of establishing such liability.
Most actions against design professionals are brought pursuant to a stan-
dard negligence theory. In a negligence action, defining the duty of care
owed by the design professional is critical to the plaintiff's ability to recover.,
What is considered relevant evidence of this duty, however, differs from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Some courts, applying rules which govern medical
and legal malpractice actions, require the plaintiff to present expert testimony
to establish the standard of care owed by the defendant. 6 Illinois courts,
those operating in the construction industry. However, the observations and conclusions drawn
regarding these design professionals apply equally to all design professionals providing similar
services.
Illinois statutes define three types of design professionals: architects, professional engineers,
and structural engineers. "An architect is a person who is qualified by education, training,
experience, and examination, and who is registered under the laws of this State to practice
architecture." ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 111, para. 1204 (1983). "Professional engineering is . . . a
profession in which a knowledge of the mathematical and natural sciences gained by study.
experience and practice, is applied with judgment to the materials and forces of nature in the
economical planning and design of engineering works, systems or devices for the benefit of
mankind." ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 111, para. 5104 (1983). A structural engineer is one "who is
engaged in the designing or supervising of the construction, enlargement or alteration of
structures, or any part thereof, for others, to be constructed by persons other than himself."
ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 111, para. 6502 (1983).
See also Crisham, Liability of Architects and Engineers to Third Parties, 26 FED'N. INS.
CouNs. Q. 177, 177 (Spring 1976) ("While philosophical distinctions can be drawn between the
meanings of the terms professional engineer and professional architect it is difficult to find
recognition of distinctions in court decisions ... fNevertheless], the legislatures of most states
continue to distinguish between the two."); Lurie & Stein, Injured Workmen: Loss Allocation
Among the Direct Participants in the Construction Process, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 292, 295 (1979)
(design professionals' duties "fall within any one of the following three categories or a
combination thereof: design, design and inspection, and construction supervision and manage-
ment"); Mills, The Design Professional-An Unlikely Defendant Under the Illinois Structural
Work Act, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 317, 317 (1979) (design professionals are architects and
engineers).
4. See infra notes 12-13.
5. See, e.g., Fence Rail Dev. Corp. v. Nelson & Assoc., 174 Ill. App. 3d 94, 528 N.E.2d
344 (2d Dist. 1988); Society of Mount Carmel v. Fox, 90 Ill. App. 3d 537, 413 N.E.2d 480 (2d
Dist. 1980).
6. See, e.g., Covil v. Robert & Co. Assocs., 112 Ga. App. 163, 144 S.E.2d 450 (1965).
"By analogy with other cases in which recovery has been sought against persons for their
negligence in performing skilled services, it was necessary here that plaintiffs establish the
standard of care applicable to defendant by the introduction of expert opinion evidence. If this
standard was not established by the necessary proof, the trial court was justified in the grant
of nonsuit." Id. at 167, 144 S.E.2d at 454 (citations omitted). Most courts adopting the rule
have also incorporated the "common knowledge exception," which requires no expert testimony
as to the defendant's standard of care where the fact finder's own knowledge is sufficient to
recognize a deviation from the accepted standard of care. See, e.g., Seaman Unified School
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however, have resisted this trend, and have declined to require such testimony
as part of a plaintiff's prima facie case.?
Dist. v. Casson Constr. Co., 3 Kan. App. 2d 289, 594 P.2d 241 (1979).
The rule may assume the form of a jury instruction requiring the jury to use expert testimony
to determine the defendant's standard of care. See, e.g., Paxton v. Alameda County, 119 Cal.
App. 2d 393, 259 P.2d 934 (1953).
At least twelve other states have adopted the rule requiring expert testimony to establish a
design professional's standard of care where the "common knowledge exception" is inapplicable.
See National Hous. Indus., Inc., v. E. L. Jones Dev. Co., 118 Ariz. 374, 576 P.2d 1374 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1978) (negligence of engineer must be based on expert testimony establishing prevailing
standard); Seiler v. Levitz Furniture Co., 367 A.2d 999 (Del. 1976) (in action against architect-
engineer, court noted general rule requiring expert testimony to establish professional standard
of care but held such testimony unnecessary where layman is competent to measure risk);
Milton J. Womack, Inc. v. House of Representatives, 509 So. 2d 62 (La. Ct. App.) (expert
testimony generally required to establish architect's deviation from standard of care, except
where laymen can infer negligence from a "common sense standard"), cert. denied, 573 So.
2d 1208 (La. 1987); Crockett v. Crothers, 264 Md. 222, 285 A.2d 612 (1972) (applying general
rule in professional malpractice actions requiring expert testimony to establish standard of care
in action against contractor); Overland Constructors, Inc. v. Millard School Dist., 220 Neb.
220, 369 N.W.2d 69 (1985) (architect's negligence must be proved by expert testimony); Daniel,
Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 98 Nev. 113, 642 P.2d 1086 (1982) (per
curiam) (expert testimony required to establish surveyor's standard of care unless conduct is
within layperson's common knowledge); 530 East 89 Corp. v. Unger, 43 N.Y.2d 776, 373
N.E.2d 276, 402 N.Y.S. 2d 382 (Ct. App. 1977) (plaintiff alleging architectural malpractice
must present expert testimony unless alleged malpractice is within jury's competence); Thomas
M. Durkin & Sons, Inc. v. Nether Providence Township School Auth., 314 Pa. Super. 131,
460 A.2d 800 (1983) (applying general rule requiring expert testimony in action against design
professional firms), rev'd on other grounds, 505 Pa. 42, 476 A.2d 904 (1984); Nauman v.
Harold K. Beecher & Assocs., 24 Utah 2d 172, 467 P.2d 610 (1970) (only qualified experts may
give required testimony as to architect's standard of care); South Burlington School Dist. v.
Calcagni-Frazier-Zajchowski Architects, Inc., 138 Vt. 33, 410 A.2d 1359 (1980) (where beyond
understanding of laymen, roof designer's standard of care must be established by expert
testimony); Nelson v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 236, 368 S.E.2d 239 (1988) (because trier of
fact may not speculate as to architect's professional standard of care, expert testimony required).
See generally Annotation, Necessity of Expert Testimony to Show Malpractice of Architect, 3
A.L.R. 4th 1023 (1981) (listing jurisdictions requiring expert testimony for design professionals).
The Eighth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals has also required expert testimony
where questions relating to the alleged negligence of an architect were beyond the comprehension
of laymen. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kakssabaum, Inc., 392 F.2d 472
(8th Cir. 1968) (applying Missouri law requiring expert testimony in medical malpractice actions
to negligence claim against architect). The Eighth Circuit later applied the rule to architectural
malpractice actions based on South Dakota law. See Jaeger v. Henningson, Durham & Ri-
chardson, Inc., 714 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1983) (citing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Helmuth, Obata &
Kakssabaum, Inc., 392 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1968)); Bartak v. Bell-Galyardt & Wells, Inc., 629
F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1980) (same). The Seventh Circuit, applying Illinois law, similarly applied
the general rule to a negligence action against an architect. See Chicago College of Osteopathic
Medicine v. George A. Fuller Co., 719 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1983).
The Supreme Court of Arkansas explicitly refused to require expert testimony as to a design
professional's standard of care. Hill Construction Co. v. Bragg, 291 Ark. 382, 725 S.W.2d 538
(1987). The court gave no rationale for its holding, stating only that the rule "applies only to
physicians, surgeons, and dentists." Id. at 390, 725 S.W.2d at 543. A Florida appellate court
refused to require the plaintiff to establish an engineer's standard of care through expert
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This article will examine how the Illinois courts have defined the standard
of care for design professionals. By exploring the rationale underlying the
use of expert testimony in other professional negligence contexts, this article
will demonstrate the need for expert testimony in establishing the standard
of care in an action involving a design professional. The purpose of the
article is to highlight the unfairness to the design professional where expert
testimony is not required. In such cases, the architect or engineer is subject
to an ever-changing standard of care, devised by fact finders who lack the
professional training and skill necessary to discern appropriate professional
standards. Indeed, under current Illinois law, an architect or engineer may
meet the standards set by the design profession, but may nonetheless be
found liable by a jury unaware that the professional standard has been
satisfied. Requiring plaintiffs to present expert testimony as to the relevant
standard of care will prevent such inequity, and allow architects and engineers
to attain their true professional status before the court.
I. THE DEsIoN PROFESSIONAL's EXPOSURE TO LW.aniTy
The design professional is exposed to three basic types of liability: breach
of contract, negligence in design, and negligence in supervision.8 An action
based in contract, however, differs little from an action for negligence
because a contract for architectural services contains a duty based in tort
law, an implied promise to exercise the ordinary and reasonable skill of the
testimony where the plaintiff had proven defendant's violation of a state regulation. Henry v.
Britt, 220 So. 2d 917 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969). Because the regulation established the minimum
standard design for safety, violation of the regulation was prima facie evidence of negligence.
Thus, requiring expert testimony might have improperly exonerated the defendant. Id. at 920.
7. The most recent Illinois court to address the issue stopped short of explicitly rejecting
application of the rule requiring expert testimony, and instead relied on an exception to the
general rule where negligence is apparent to a layman. See Fence Rail Develop. v. Nelson &
Assocs., 174 I1. App. 3d 94, 528 N.E.2d 344 (2d Dist. 1988). See also in/fra text accompanying
notes 56-72.
A Seventh Circuit panel has interpreted Illinois' general rule requiring expert testimony as to
a physician's standard of care to apply to a negligence claim against an architect. Chicago
College of Osteopathic Medicine v. George A. Fuller Co., 719 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1983).
8. See generally Note, Architectural Malpractice: A Contract-Based Approach, 92 HAuv.
L. REv. 1075, 1089, 1094 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Architectural Malpractice] (architects may
be liable in contract to the contractor or client, and to job site workers or the general public
for injuries due to "negligent design or breach of a duty of supervision"). See also Crisham,
Liability of Architects and Engineers to Third Parties, Fn'tN. INs. Courts. Q. 178, 184 (Spring
1976) (architect may be liable to those in contractual privity and those injured by negligent
design or supervision); Peck & Hock, Engineer's Liability, 23 TRiAL 42, 46 (Feb. 1987) (engineer
may be liable for a contractual breach or for negligence to workers mtid bystanders); Note, The
Architect's Tort Liability For Personal Injury, 17 DRAXE L. Rha. ?A2, 254 (1968) (architect
may be liable for negligent design or for breach of a contractual or common-law duty to
supervise).
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design profession.9 If the contract documents do not define a standard of
care applicable to this duty, then the court usually applies the tort standard
of reasonable care.'0 Thus, defining the standard of care is essential even
when suing a design professional for a contractual breach.
The standard of reasonable care also applies to the design professional in
actions for negligent design .or supervision." Until recently, however, the
doctrine of privity prevented such actions by anyone not a party to the
contract.' 2 Since the fall of the privity defense, the design professional has
9. See, e.g., Mississippi Meadows, Inc. v. Hodson, 13 Ill. App. 3d 24, 26, 299 N.E.2d
359, 361 (3d Dist. 1973) ("The duty of an architect depends upon the particular agreement he
has entered with the person who employs him and in the absence of a special agreement...
he is only liable if he fails to exercise reasonable care and skill"), appeal denied, 54 Ill. 2d 597
(1973); Miller v. DeWitt, 59 Il. App. 2d 38, 208 N.E.2d 249, 284 (4th Dist. 1965), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967) ("The architects in
contracting for their services implied ... that they would exercise and apply in the case their
skill, ability and judgment reasonably and without neglect."). See also J. SWEET, LEuAL AsPEcTs
oF ARCHITECTURE, EOn, EEPn;o AND TEEE CONSTRUCMoN PROCESS 838-39 (2d ed. 1977) (because
the professional standard is one of reasonableness, client may treat contract breach as a tort);
Note, Architectural Malpractice, supra note 8, at 1089 (suit brought in contract similar to one
brought in tort because "contract interpretation is infected with tort standard of reasonable
care") (citations omitted).
10. The design professional's tort standard of reasonable care was enunciated in Coombs
v. Beede, 89 Me. 187, 36 A. 104 (1896). In a widely followed decision the Supreme Court of
Maine said:
The responsibility resting on an architect is essentially the same as that which rests
upon the lawyer to his client, or upon the physician to his patient, or which rests
upon anyone to another where such person pretends to possess some special skill
and ability in some special employment, and offers his services to the public on
account of his fitness to act in the line of business for which he may be employed.
The undertaking of an architect implies that he possesses skill and ability, including
taste, sufficient enough to enable him to perform the required services at least
ordinarily and reasonably well; and that he will exercise and apply, in the given
case, his skill and ability, his judgement and taste reasonably and without neglect.
Id. at 188, 36 A. at 104-05.
11. E.g., Rosos Litho Supply Corp. v. Hansen, 123 Ill. App. 3d 290, 462 N.E.2d 566 (1st
Dist. 1984).
12. The doctrine of privity requires the existence of a legally recognized relationship between
the parties. The doctrine originated in the English case Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep.
402 (Ex. Ch. 1842), where the court expressed concern for complications in determining cause
and effect, and the burdening of parties with liability beyond which they had contracted. Strict
adherence to the rule allows a contractor whose negligence caused an injury to someone not in
contractual privity to escape liability. Hunt v. Blasius, 74 Ill. 2d 203, 207-08, 384 N.E.2d 368,
370 (1979).
Illinois applied the doctrine of privity not only to independent contractors, but also to
suppliers of chattels. E.g., Watts v. Bacon & VanBuskirk, 18 Il1. 2d 226, 231-32, 163 N.E.2d
425, 428 (1959) (glass supplier not liable to third parties injured by its product unless the
product was inherently dangerous or defectively made). The severity of the privity doctrine,
however, brought exceptions. For example, in Davidson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 171 11.
App. 355 (1st Dist. 1912), the court carved out three exceptions to the privity requirement: 1)
where manufacturer or vendor acts negligently with respect to an inherently dangerous article;
2) where a land owner's negligence causes injury to an invitee on the premises; and 3) where
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become liable to potentially anyone lawfully on the property who is injured
due to the design professional's failure to exercise the ordinary skills of his
profession. 3 Although courts have expanded the design professional's lia-
one sells or delivers an inherently dangerous product without giving notice of its danger. Id.
at 364. In 1916, the privity defense was held inapplicable to a manufacturer's liability for the
negligent design of chattels. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, I11 N.E.
1050 (1916). In MacPherson, Judge Cardozo stated that a manufacturer who marketed an
inherently dangerous product, which was defectively made, was liable to anyone who foreseeably
might use that product. Id. at 389, III N.E. at 1054. The Illinois Supreme Court expressly
rejected the general rule of non-liability in Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Il. 2d 612, 210
N.E.2d 182 (1965). There, the court declared the general Illinois rule that a manufacturer may
be liable for injuries to third persons not in privity with him and that such liability is governed
by the rules governing any action in negligence. 32 Ill. 2d at 616-17, 210 N.E.2d at 185.
The doctrine remained effective in construction law after it was rejected in other contexts.
See Comment, The Supervising Architect: His Liabilities and His Remedies When a Worker is
Injured, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 535, 538-48 (1969) (hereinafter Comment. Supervising Architect's
Liabilities]. The landmark case rejecting the privity defense within the construction industry is
Inman v. Binghamton Housing Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957).
The architect in Inman designed a porch without a railing. A child fell from the porch and
was injured. The court held that the foreseeability test applied to architects and that injured
persons no longer needed to show contractual privity in order to recover. Id. at 146, 143 N.E.2d
at 899, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 705. Illinois more recently rejected the privity defense for design
professionals, and adopted the foreseeability test. See infra text accompanying notes 29-35. The
privity defense however, is generally no obstacle in actions against design professionals brought
by sureties, contractors, subcontractors or third parties. See Block, As the Walls Came Tumbling
Down: Architects' Expanded Liability Under Design-Build/Construction Contracting, 17 J.
MARSHALL L. Rv. 1, 5-6 (1984) (listing cases).
13. The design professional owes a duty to those members of the general public who can
be reasonably anticipated to be present in the structure. See Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., 78
Ill. App. 2d 153, 161, 222 N.E.2d 584, 588 (4th Dist. 1966). See also infra text accompanying
notes 29-35. The Illinois legislature attempted to protect design professionals by limiting the
time period during which one can sue those designing real estate improvements for damage to
persons or property arising out of defective and unsafe conditions. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 83,
para. 24(f) (1965). This statute placed a four-year limitation on any such action against architects
and contractors while excluding all other possible defendants. The Illinois Supreme Court struck
down the statute of limitations in Skinner v. Anderson, 38 11. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).
The court found that the statute granted special and exclusive immunities to architects and
contractors and therefore violated article 4 of the Illinois Constitution. Id. at 459, 231 N.E.2d
at 590.
The legislature rewrote the statute in 1983. The amended statute stated that any action based
on negligence "in the design, planning, supervision, observation or management of construction
... shall be commenced within two years from the time the person bringing an action ...
knew or should reasonably have known" of such negligence. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. I10, para.
13-214(a) (1983). The statute barred all actions not brought within twelve years of the date of
the alleged negligent act. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 110, para 13-214(b). The Illinois Supreme Court
upheld the statute as a reasonable classification by the General Assembly, and thus it did not
constitute "special legislation" prohibited by the state constitution. People ex rel. Skinner v.
Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 114 Il1. 2d 252, 500 N.E.2d 34 (1986). The court noted
with approval that the statute classifies not on the basis of status but on the activities performed.
Id. at 261-62, 500 N.E.2d at 37-38. The court also noted that the legislature traditionally
enacted statutes of limitations which vary as to the activity and the cause of action involved
and that such classification was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Id. at 263, 500 N.E.2d at
38.
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bility to extend to all persons who forseeably may be on the premises, they
have almost universally refused to apply concepts of strict liability 4 and
warranty." Therefore, design professionals, like attorneys and physicians,
are liable to anyone injured when their conduct falls below the professional
standard of reasonable conduct. However, unlike attorneys and physicians,
the nature of the design professional's work creates potential liability to a
far greater number of people.',
A. Expert Testimony and the Professional Standard of Care
Generally, in order to establish a prima facie case of ordinary negligence,
a plaintiff must initially show that the defendant owed a duty of care to the
plaintiff, and that the defendant breached that duty.17 The plaintiff estab-
lishes a breach by showing that the defendant's conduct fell below that of
a reasonably careful person."' To this end the plaintiff elicits proof as to
the standard of care that a "reasonable man" would have exhibited had he
been in the defendant's shoes at the time of the alleged negligence.' 9
However, in a negligence or malpractice action against a professional, a
standard of care different from that of a layman is applied. The professional
is held to a standard which comports with the learning, skill and care
ordinarily associated with and practiced by those professionals who practice
in the same region as the defendant professional at the time of the alleged
negligence.2 0 Courts often require a plaintiff to present expert testimony in
order to establish this professional standard of care, and the resulting
breach.2 ' The exception to this rule arises where the negligence of a profes-
sional is so obvious that it is easily recognized by the average juror.?2
14. Lowrie v. City of Evanston, 49 I1. App. 3d 982, 365 N.E.2d 923 (5th Dist. 1977)
(building is not a product for purposes of strict products liability concept). See generally Block,
supra note 2, at 24-31 (review of cases applying strict liability principles to design profession).
15. See, e.g., Bates & Rogers Construction Corp. v. North Shore Sanitary Dist., 92 Ill.
App. 3d 90, 414 N.E.2d 1274 (2d Dist. 1980) (engineers did not warrant the accuracy of plans
and specifications but owed only a duty of reasonable care to contractor); Mississippi Meadows,
Inc. v. Hodson, 13 I1. App. 3d 24, 299 N.E.2d 359 (3d Dist.) (absent special contractual
provision, architect "does not imply or guarantee a perfect plan or satisfactory result"), appeal
denied, 54 I1. 2d 597 (1973).
16. Suits against physicians and attorneys are generally limited to their clients and patients.
A design professional, however, may be sued by any member of the public who is injured in
or around the building. See infra text accompanying notes 29-35.
17. E.g., Wimmer v. Koenigseder, 108 11. 2d 435, 440, 484 N.E.2d 1088, 1091 (1985).
18. E.g., Hardware State Bank v. Cotner, 55 Il. 2d 240, 247, 302 N.E.2d 257, 262 (1973).
19. Id.
20. See PROSSER AND KeamoN ON TORTS ch. 5, § 32 (5th ed. 1984)(discussing higher standard
of care required of those with special skills including professionals).
21. See, e.g., Gasbarra v. St. James Hospital, 85 Ill. App. 3d 32, 36, 406 N.E.2d 544, 548
(Ist. Dist. 1979) (requiring expert testimony to establish standard of care required of doctors
in the diagnosis and treatment of illness tendered emergency room patients).
22. See, e.g., House v. Maddox, 46 Ill. App. 3d 68, 72-73, 360 N.E.2d 580, 584 (Ist Dist.
1977) (attorney's failure to file lawsuit prior to running of statute of limitations indicated such
19891
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Where courts have required expert testimony, it has been deemed essential
for two reasons. First, professional procedures, such as those involved in
law and medicine, may be too complex for jurors to understand.23 Thus, a
jury would have difficulty even discerning the standard with which the
professional must comply. Second, the law distinguishes between errors in
professional judgment and negligence. While a plaintiff may suffer an injury
due to an error in the professional's judgment, this exercise of judgment
may be within an acceptable range of decisions and within the standard of
care for that profession.2 For example, the expert testimony of a physician
that he would have pursued a course of action different from that chosen
by the defendant physician neither establishes nor supports an inference of
negligence. " The defendant's choice may have been well within the range of
reasonable professional conduct.
Thus, the use of an expert not only facilitates a greater understanding of
the case in the minds of jurors, it also protects the professional from the
imposition of liability merely because his efforts culminated in what his
client and the jury perceive as a bad result.? Although the requirement of
expert testimony rule is well established in the areas of medical and legal
malpractice, design professionals in Illinois do not enjoy the same protection.
B. Illinois Law Regarding Design Professionals
Liability for design professionals in Illinois has undergone dramatic changes
in the last quarter century. Specifically, two decisions in the mid-1960's
expanded the legal duties of design professionals and, correspondingly, the
range of people to whom those duties are owed. The first of these two
decisions, Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co.,27 abolished the privity requirement
obvious malpractice that expert testimony not necessary); City of Urbandale v. Frevert-Ramsey-
Kobes, Architects-Engineers, Inc., 454 N.W.2d 400 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (evidence of blisters
in roof and streaks down walls constituted such obvious negligence of engineer that expert
testimony was unnecessary).
23. Cf. Schmidt v. Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, 75 III. App. 3d 516,
523, 394 N.E.2d 559, 564 (1st Dist. 1979) (expert testimony necessary in order to explain
complexities in drafting complex, multi-document purchase and sale agreement regarding sale
of a business); Scardina v. Colletti, 63 I11. App. 2d 481, 485, 211 N.E.2d 762, 764 (1st Dist.
1965) (expert testimony necessary to describe proper method of cutting and clamping blood
vessels during hernia operation).
24. Brainerd v. Kates, 68 III. App. 3d 781, 786, 386 N.E.2d 586. 590 (1st Dist. 1979) (failure
of defendant attorney to accurately ascertain date which triggered the running of time period
for filing notice of appeal did not amount to professional malpractice).
25. Walski v. Tiesenga, 72 I1. 2d 249, 261, 381 N.E.2d 279, 285 (1978). The rationale
behind this rule is that a professional is expected to excercise a certain level of judgement, and
because medicine is an inexact science, a physician may exercise due care by merely opting for
a particular procedure within an established framework. Id.
26. Scardina v. Colletti, 63 111. App. 2d 481, 488, 211 N.E.2d 762, 766 (1st Dist. 1965)
(evidence indicating that plaintiff suffered post-operative internal bleeding does not by itself
establish lack of skill or proper care on the part of the operating physician).
27. 78 Il. App. 2d 153, 222 N.E.2d 584 (4th Dist. 1966).
880 [Vol. 38:873
19891 DESIGN PROFESSIONALS' LIABILITY
for plaintiffs suing negligent design professionals. Shortly thereafter, the
Illinois Supreme Court, in Miller v. DeWitt,28 expanded the supervisory
Uuties of design professionals. These two decisions both diminished the
contract's importance in defining the design professional's scope of liability,
and elevated tort liability to its new prominence in this area.
The Illinois appellate court, in Laukkanen, rejected the defendants' privity
defense to a negligence action, thereby enlarging the class of persons to
whom design professionals owe a duty. 29 The plaintiff in Laukkanen was
struck and injured by a concrete block pylon as she entered a building
designed by the defendant engineers. 0 The court rejected the defendants'
contention that their duty of care extended only to the contractual parties.
Instead, the court determined that the engineers owed a duty to those "who
can be reasonably anticipated to be present in the structure they designed."'3
Following the lead of New York's highest court3 2 the Illinois appellate court
increased the scope of liability for design professionals.
The Laukkanen court also explored the standard of care to which a design
professional is held. The court stated: "[Il]iability rests only on unskillfulness
or negligence, and not upon mere errors of judgment .... -33 The qUestion
of the defendant's design negligence was described as one of fact and,
consequently, an issue for the jury.3 4 Although the court relied on expert
28. 59 I1. App. 2d 38, 208 N.E.2d 249 (4th Dist. 1965), revd on other grounds, 37 Ill. 2d
273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
29. 78 Ill. App. 2d at 161, 222 N.E.2d at 588. "Negligence which proximately causes injury
will require the negligent actor to respond in damages for the harm suffered, where the injury
is foreseeable, regardless of the prior relationship of the parties." Id. at 162, 222 N.E.2d at
589.
30. Id. at 157, 222 N.E.2d at 586. The plaintiff attempted to enter the building, a retail
grocery store, during a severe thunderstorm. She was rendered a paraplegic from the falling
pylon. Id.
31. Id. at 161, 222 N.E.2d at 588.
32. Inman v. Binghamton Housing Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d
699 (Ct. App. 1957).
33. 78 Ill. App. 2d at 161, 222 N.E.2d at 588. (quoting 5 AM JuR 2d Architects § 23, at
686-87). The professional negligence standard of care for architects and engineers has been
compared to the duty owed by physicians and other professionals. See, e.g., Rosos Litho Supply
Corp. v. Hansen, 123 Il. App. 3d 290, 462 N.E.2d 566 (1984).
Those who employ [architects] perceive their skills and abilities to rise above the
levels possessed by ordinary laymen. Such persons have the right to expect that
architects, as other professionals, possess a standard minimum of special knowledge
and ability, will exercise that degree of care and skill as may be reasonable under
the circumstances and, when they fail to do so, that they will be subject to damage
actions for professional negligence, as are other professionals.
Id. at 295, 462 N.E.2d at 571. See also Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine v. George A.
Fuller Co., 719 F.2d 1335, 1345 (7th Cir. 1983) (approving jury instruction defining architects'
standard of care which was patterned after Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction for medical
profession).
34. 78 Ill. App. 3d at 163, 222 N.E.2d at 588 (quoting 5 AM Ju t 2d Architects § 23, at
686-87).
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testimony in deciding that the evidence addressed at trial was sufficient to
support a jury verdict against the defendants, 5 it did not rule that such
testimony was necessary for a prima facie case in negligence.
In Miller v. DeWitt, the Illinois Supreme Court defined and expanded the
supervisory duties of the design professional. 6 There, employees of a con-
tractor sued the defendant architects, who were responsible for supervising
the construction, for damages due to injuries suffered as a result of a roof
collapse. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had breached their duty
to supervise the construction of the building to insure compliance with the
contractual specifications. 7
The Miller court relied on the contract between the architect and the
contractor to impose liability. The court noted that the terms of the contract
between the owner-architect and the owner-contractor gave the supervisory
architects the right to stop any unsafe work practices which violated the
contracts. 8 Although the supervisory architects had no duty to specify work
methods, they had a contractual right to insist upon safe methods.39 From
this right the court found an implicit "corresponding duty" to stop the work
until the construction conditions had been made safer. 40 The court found
35. Id. at 158-59, 222 N.E.2d at 587-88. An expert witness for the plaintiff, for example,
testified that the winds which caused the concrete block pylon to fall were within the range of
winds to be expected in the area of the building. Id.
36. 59 I11. App. 2d 38, 208 N.E.2d 249 (4th Dist. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 37 III. 2d
273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
37. Id.
38. Id. The owner-architect contract included among the architects' duties "the general
administration of the construction contracts and supervision of the work" id. at 75, 208 N.E.2d
at 267, and "general supervision and direction of the work," and gave the architects the
authority to "stop the work whenever such stoppage may be necessary to insure the proper
execution of the contract." Id. at 80, 208 N.E.2d at 269. The owner-contractor agreement
provided that the contractor "shall take all necessary precautions for the safety of employees
on the work." Id.
39. Id. at 281, 226 N.E.2d at 638. The supreme court stated that the architect's failure to
stop the work and make the contractor add extra shoring, even though he had no authority to
specify such work methods, could have led the jury to find the architect negligent. Id. at 284,
226 N.E.2d at 639.
40. Id. "[l]f the architects knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known
that the shoring was inadequate and unsafe, they had the right and the corresponding duty to
stop the work until the unsafe condition had been remedied." Id. The Miller court's transfor-
mation of a right into a duty has been roundly criticized. See, e.g., Comment, Supervising
Architect's Liabilities, supra note 12, at 546-48 ( Miller decision is o~ersimplified and failed to
consider policy implications); Note, The Crumbling Tower of Architectural Immunity: Evolution
and Expansion of the Liability to Third Parties, 45 Omo ST. L.J. 217, 242 (1984) (imposing
duty upon architect to protect workers from unsafe work conditions results in liability greater
than that contemplated by contractual parties). The Illinois Supreme Court later returned to
the issue of an architect's duty to supervise when deciding whether an architect was a person
"having charge of" a construction site under Illinois statute. In McGovern v. Standish, 65 III.
2d 54, 357 N.E.2d 1134 (1976), the court held that an architect sued by an injured construction
worker under the Illinois Structural Work Act was not liable because the architect did not have
a duty to supervise construction methods. The contract terms were similar to those in Miller,
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that breach of this duty constituted both negligence under common law
principles and negligence per se by its violation of the Structural Work Act. 4'
Furthermore, the court accepted the parties' stipulation that the architects
could be held liable to those who forseeably may be injured by their
negligence, regardless of privity.42
In his dissent, Justice House opposed the majority's interpretation of the
contract as embodying a duty which, in his view, the parties had not
contemplated. 4 The duty to inspect is generally interpreted as a means to
facilitate the architect's duty to the owner, and the architect only undertakes
this duty to insure that the work is completed according to the plans and
specifications.M Therefore, according to the dissent, this duty should not
except that the architect did not have the right to direct or control construction methods. Id.
at 63, 357 N.E.2d at 1138-39. "Indeed ... the defendant's function was limited to generally
overseeing the work in an effort to ensure that the completed project conformed with the plans
and specifications." Id. at 69, 357 N.E.2d at 1142. See generally Mills, supra note 3, at 324-
30 (tracking Illinois Supreme Court decisions on architects' liability under the Structural Work
Act).
41. 37 II. 2d at 286, 226 N.E.2d at 639. The supreme court adopted the lower court's
reasoning in affirming the statutory violation. Id. See also Miller, 59 Ill. App. 2d 38, 123-28,
208 N.E.2d 249, 289-91 (4th Dist. 1965) (construing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 60-69 (1981)).
The lower court stated that it was not necessary that there be a reckless disregard of the
Structural Work Act provisions. Rather, a party may become liable if the dangerous condition
is known to him or, by the exercise of reasonable care, he could have discovered the dangerous
condition. Id. at 125, 208 N.E.2d at 290. The Structural Work Act, ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 48,
paras. 60-69 (1981), also called the Scaffolding Act, provides for the protection and safety of
persons in and about the construction of buildings, bridges, viaducts and other structures. The
statute provides workers in extrahazardous occupations with a safe place to work and should
be liberally construed to achieve that end. Halberstadt v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 55 Ii.
2d 121, 127, 302 N.E.2d 64, 67 (1973); Claffy v. Chicago Dock & Canal Co., 249 Il1. 210,
218-19, 94 N.E. 551, 553-54 (1911).
Section 1 of the Act provides:
That all scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders, supports, or other mechanical
contrivances, erected or constructed by any person, firm or corporation in this State
for the use in the erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any house,
building, bridge, viaduct, or other structure, shall be erected and constructed in a
safe, suitable and proper manner ....
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, para. 60 (1981).
Section 9, the enforcement section of the Act, provides that:
Any owner, contractor, sub-contractor, foreman or other person having charge of
the erection, construction, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any building,
bridge, viaduct or other structure within the provisions of this act, shall comply
with all terms thereof ....
ILL. Rsv. STAT. ch. 48, para. 69 (1985). See generally Mills, supra note 3 (discussing implications
of Structural Work Act).
42. 37 I1. 2d at 283, 226 N.E.2d at 637.
43. 37 II. 2d at 292-94, 226 N.E. 2d at 642-43 (House, J., dissenting). The contract
specifically disclaimed any guarantee of the contractor's performance. Id. at 293, 226 N.E.2d
at 642.
44. Id. at 284, 226 N.E.2d at 638. The Miller majority, however, found that the architect
had contracted for an increased duty to inspect when the contract between the owner and the
contractor was read in conjunction with the contract between the owner and the architect. Id.
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extend to the general public. Furthermore, Justice House contended that the
duty created by the Miller majority was not contemplated by the contracting
parties and was inconsistent with general usage in the architectural profes-
sion. 45 Finally, the dissent concluded that imposing a greater supervisory
duty on architects would interfere with the traditional roles of the architect
45. Id. at 293-94, 226 N.E.2d at 642-43 (House, J., dissenting). The duty to supervise the
work is generally taken as a duty to see that the building, when constructed, meets the plans
and specifications contracted for by the owner. Day v. National United States Radiator Corp.,
241 La. 288, 304-05, 128 So. 2d 660, 666 (1961). Standard legal forms between owner and
architect appear to limit the architect's duty to inspecting for compliance with contract speci-
fications. See 27 WEST'S LEOAL FORMS § 10.201(4) (2d ed. 1986) ("The Architect shall thereafter
supervise the construction through to completion with thoroughness and fidelity and it shall be
his responsibility to see to it that all contract requirements shall be fully complied with."). See
also Block, supra note 2, at 9-10 (discussing American Institute of Architects owner-architect
form contract that seeks to limit architect's liability).
Since the Miller decision, at least twelve states have expressly rejected the broader duty
created by the Illinois Supreme Court and have held that the duty to supervise corresponds
with the general duties set forth in Day. See Reber v. Chandler High School Dist., 13 Ariz.
App. 133, 474 P.2d 852 (1970); Wheeler & Lewis v. Slifer, 195 Colo. 291, 577 P.2d 1092 (1978);
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Chesapeake Utils. Corp., 436 A.2d 314 (Del. 1981); Walters
v. Kellam & Foley, 172 Ind. App. 207, 360 N.E.2d 199 (1977); Vorndran v. Wright, 367 So.
2d 1070 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Hanna v. Huer, Johns, Neel, Rivers & Webb, 233 Kan.
206, 662 P.2d 243 (1983); Krieger v. J.E. Greiner Co., 282 Md. 50, 382 A.2d 1069 (1978);
Brown v. Gamble Constr. Co., 537 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Fox v. Jenny Eng'g
Corp., 122 A.D.2d 532, 505 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Bernard Johnson, Inc. v.
Continental Constructors, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); Porter v. Stevens,
Thompson & Runyan, Inc., 24 Wash. App. 624, 602 P.2d 1192 (19791; Luterbach v. Mochon,
Schutte, Hackworthy, Juersson, Inc., 84 Wis. 2d 1, 267 N.W.2d 13 (1978).
It has been suggested that the underlying motive for the Miller decision was the court's desire
to circumvent the limited recovery available to injured workmen from their employer under
workmen's compensation statutes. See, e.g., Note, Miller v. DeWitt: Architect's Liability for
Failure to Supervise Contractor's Methods, 72 DIcK. L. Rv. 506, 518-19 (1968). Worker's
compensation statutes set a fixed ceiling on compensation for injuries. The worker recovers
regardless of negligence or fault; and the worker's contributory negligence does not affect the
amount of compensation. In return for the guaranteed recovery, the worker relinquishes any
right to sue his employer. See, e.g., ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138, 138.30 (1981). For a
general discussion of worker's compensation laws, see A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSA7ON (1964). Often the recovery ceiling inadequately compensates for the severity of
the injury, thus the worker looks to sue someone other than his employer. See Comment, Up
Against the Wall, Master Builder: The Architect's Legal Status, 23 ST. Louns U.L.J. 384, 407-
08 (1979).
However, legislative revision of worker's compensation statutes represents an easier and more
specific remedy than allowing suits against design professionals. Id. For example, the Oklahoma
legislature recently enacted a statute requiring the general contractor to carry worker's com-
pensation insurance on every public work's project and to name the architect and engineer as
additional insured parties. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 113.B.4 (1986). See also KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-501(f) (1986) (no construction design professional shall be liable for any injury compensable
under the worker's compensation statute which results from the employer's failure to comply
with safety standards, unless the contract specifically assigns safety responsibility to the design
professional).
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and contractor, and create "utter chaos" at the construction site.46
Since Laukkanen and Miller, Illinois courts have grappled with clarifying
the standard of care for design professionals under these expanded duties.
Because a design professional's duty is measured by the ordinary and rea-
sonable skill of those in the profession, 47 the role of expert testimony in
defining that standard has often been at issue. For example, the plaintiff's
failure to define the defendant's standard of care was one basis for reversal
of a jury verdict in Mississippi Meadows, Inc. v. Hodson.48 There, a con-
tractor sued the architect for the alleged failure of the architect's building
design to conform to existing topography and local building regulations.4 9
The court, however, noted the plaintiff's lack of evidence that the architect
violated the local building code and also noted the lack of expert testimony
regarding the appropriate standards concerning the architect's plans.5 0 Be-
cause the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of negligence, the
appellate court reversed the jury verdict."'
Similarly, expert testimony was crucial to the appellate court's affirmance
of a negligence finding in Society of Mt. Carmel v. Fox. 2 There, architects
and engineers for both plaintiff and defendant testified as to the relevant
standard of care for architects at the time of design and construction. 3 The
appellate court described the negligence issue as "a classic battle of the
experts ' 5 4 and upheld the trial court's judgment for the plaintiffs."
While Illinois courts have frequently relied on expert testimony in meas-
uring the sufficiency of evidence establishing the negligence of design profes-
sionals, they have declined to require plaintiffs to present such evidence to
establish the relevant standard of care.16 The question of whether expert
46. 37 Ill. 2d at 294, 226 N.E.2d at 643 (House, J., dissenting). Justice House also predicted
that the greater supervisory duty imposed upon architects would create an "unnecessary and
unwarranted financial burden upon the public without a commensurate benefit." Id.
47. See, e.g., Mississippi Meadows, Inc. v. Hodson, 13 Ill. App. 3d 24, 26, 299 N.E.2d
359, 361 (3d Dist.) (citing Annotation, Responsibility of One Acting as Architect for Defects
or Insufficiency of Work Attributable to Plans, 25 A.L.R. 2d 1085, 1088 (1952)), appeal denied,
54 Iil. 2d 597 (1973).
48. 13 I11. App. 3d 24, 299 N.E.2d 359 (3d Dist. 1973).
49. Id. at 28, 299 N.E.2d at 363.
50. Id. at 27-28, 299 N.E.2d at 362-63. The court seemed to be saying that the lack of
expert testimony doomed the plaintiff's case, but they did not explicitly instruct the jury that
such testimony was required. Id.
51. Id. at 30, 299 N.E.2d at 364.
52. 90 III. App. 3d 537, 413 N.E.2d 480 (2d Dist 1980).
53. Id. at 540-41, 413 N.E.2d at 483-84.
54. Id. at 542, 413 N.E.2d at 484.
55. Id. at 542-43, 413 N.E.2d at 485. The court stated that other evidence introduced at
trial did not conclusively establish a standard nor did it conclusively support the experts'
testimony. However, the trial court's decision was not against the manifest weight of evidence.
90 I1. App. 3d at 542, 413 N.E.2d at 485.
56. See, e.g., Miller v. DeWitt, 59 III. App. 2d 38, 108 N.E.2d 249 (4th Dist. 1965), rev'd
on other grounds, 37 II. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967). Although the expert witnesses were
19891
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testimony was essential to a prima facie case arose in Rosos Litho Supply
Corp. v. Hansen.17 In Rosos Litho, the defendant-architect contended that
the plaintiff's failure to present expert testimony constituted a failure to
establish the standard of care. 8 The defendant analogized to the need for
expert testimony in cases involving attorney and physician negligence, 9 and
referred to other jurisdictions which require expert testimony for design
professionals.60 The appellate court, however, stated that the standard of
care was sufficiently established by the evidence, and noted that prior Illinois
decisions have defined an architect's duty by reference to the particular
employment contract. 6' The Rothos Litho court relied on expert testimony
to uphold the trial verdict, 62 but refused to require such testimony as an
element of a plaintiff's case.
The issue of the necessity of experts to the prima facie case arose once
again in Fence Rail Development Corp. v. Nelson & Assoc. 61 Once again,
the court refused to require the use of expert testimony to establish the
design professional's standard of care. Once again, the court refused to
require the use of expert testimony to establish the design professional's
standard of care, but, identified a broad exception to the need for experts
all architects, the trial court refused the defendants' proposed instruction requiring the jurors
to base the standard of care only on expert testimony. The appellate court found the trial
court's refusal to give the proposed instruction proper because Illinois law did not require
expert testimony to establish a malpractice action against a design professional. 59 Ill. App. 2d
at 134, 208 N.E.2d at 294. The supreme court summarily dismissed the defendants' argument
for the jury instruction and found the appellate court's decision on that subject to be "adequate
and correct." 37 I1. 2d at 287, 226 N.E.2d at 639.
57. 123 Ill. App. 3d 290, 462 N.E.2d 566 (1st Dist. 1984). The plaintiff in Rosos Litho
sued the defendant-architect for the faulty construction of a storage building addition to the
plaintiff's existing structure. The jury found the architect and two other defendants guilty of
negligence but found no breach of contract. Id.
58. 123 Ill. App. 3d at 298-99, 462 N.E.2d at 573.
59. Id. See, e.g., Walski v. Tiesenga, 72 Il1. 2d 249, 381 N.E.2d 279 (1978) (plaintiff alleging
medical malpractice may not recover in absence of expert testimony); Brown v. Gitlin, 19 Ill.
App. 3d 1018, 313 N.E.2d 180 (1974) ("the standard of care against which an [attorney's]
actions are measured must be based on expert testimony").
60. See, e.g., 530 East Corp. v. Unger, 43 N.Y.2d 776, 373 N.E.2d 276, 402 N.Y.S.2d 382
(1977) (requiring expert testimony where architect's alleged malpractice not within competence
of "an untutored layman"); National Cash Register Co. v. Haak, 233 Pa. Super. 562, 335
A.2d 407 (1975) ("expert testimony is necessary to establish negligent practice in any profes-
sion").
61. 123 Ill. App. 3d at 299, 462 N.E.2d at 573 (citing Bates & Rogers Construction Corp.
v. North Shore Sanitary Dist., 92 Ill. App. 3d 90, 414 N.E.2d 1274 (1981)). See also Mississippi
Meadows, Inc. v. Hodson, 13 Ill. App. 3d 24, 299 N.E.2d 359 (3d Dist 1973). The Roses Litho
court ruled that the standard of care was established by provisions in the contract and by the
trial testimony of architects and engineers. Hansen's own testizviony, the court noted, proved
that he knew of the problem and his failure to correct it could lead the jury to infer that he
was negligent. Id. at 299-300, 462 N.E.2d at 574.
62. 123 I1. App. 3d at 299-300, 462 N.E. 2d at 574.
63. 174 Ill. App. 3d 94, 528 N.E.2d 344 (2d Dist. 1988).
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in professional negligence cases. 4 There, a builder sued an architect for the
defendant's alleged negligence in supplying incorrect house foundation plans.
The contract called for plans based on a "Georgian" style house, however,
the architect delivered plans for a "Brookside" home. 65
The court declined to require expert testimony stating that "[ilt does not
take a degree in architecture to determine the error." In doing so, the
court implicitly relied on the "common knowledge" exception of the expert
testimony requirement in professional negligence cases, to justify its hold-
ing.67 The court noted that under this exception, if the error was such an
apparent breach of duty that a layman would have no difficulty in appraising
it, then expert testimony was not required. 6
In both Fence Rail and Rosos Litho, the Illinois courts declined to require
that the standard of care be established by expert testimony, and instead
relied on the contract to establish this element of the case. 69 However, reliance
on the contract for this purpose is inappropriate. The contract merely defines
the general tasks that the design professional agrees to perform for the owner
and is inappropriate as an embodiment of the duties owed to third parties.
While the contract may define what the design professional has agreed to
design or what construction he has agreed to supervise, it does not define
the level of skill with which the design professional must complete these
tasks. It is only after these contractual duties are defined, that the design
64. Id. at 99, 528 N.E.2d at 347. See also Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine v.
George A. Fuller Co., 719 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1983) (in action based on diversity jurisdiction,
federal court interpreted Illinois law as requiring expert testimony to prove architect's negligence
except where case requires only common sense or involves gross negligence). The Seventh Circuit
panel, however, could cite no Illinois case applying the rule to design professionals. It merely
cited generally to Walski v. Tiesenga, 72 II1. 2d 249, 256, 381 N.E.2d 279, 285 (1978), which
required expert testimony to establish a physician's standard of care, and to other jurisdictions
applying the rule to design professionals. 719 F.2d at 1346.
65. Id. at 96, 528 N.E.2d at 345.
66. Id. at 98-99, 528 N.E.2d at 347. The court relied on Rosos Litho Supply Corp. v.
Hansen, 123 Ill. App. 3d 290, 462 N.E.2d 566 (1st Dist. 1984), and defined the architect's duty
by referring to the particular employment contract. Id. at 99, 528 N.E.2d at 347.
67. Id. at 99, 528 N.E.2d at 347. "Defendant cites Schmidt but ignores the comment in
Schmidt where the court explains that where professional negligence is so grossly apparent that
a layman would have no difficulty in appraising it as where the record discloses such an
obvious, explicit, and undisputed breach of duty, expert testimony would not be required." Id.
(citing Schmidt v. Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, 75 11. App. 3d 516, 394
N.E.2d 559 (1979)). See also Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine v. George A. Fuller
Co., 719 F.2d 1335, 1346 (7th Cir. 1983) (upholding in contractor's diversity jurisdiction suit
against architect; a jury instruction based on Illinois pattern instruction for medical malpractice
actions, requiring expert testimony as to architect's standard of care). See infra note 86 and
accompanying text (discussion of the common knowledge exception to the rule requiring expert
testimony).
68. 174 I11. App. 3d 94, 99, 528 N.E.2d 344, 347 (2d Dist. 1988).
69. See Fence Rail, 174 I1. App. 3d at 98-99, 528 N.E.2d at 347; Rosos Litho, 123 III.
App. 3d at 299, 462 N.E.2d at 573.
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professional owes a general duty to use reasonable care in performing the
contract.
0
The standard of reasonableness is analogous to the professional standard
of care for physicians and attorneys. 71 Not surprisingly, courts which have
required expert testimony to establish a design professional's standard of
care have referred to the similar rule for professional negligence actions
against physicians and attorneys.7 2 The reasons for requiring expert testimony
in such malpractice actions, as well as the history and evolution of expert
testimony in general, support the need in Illinois for a similar rule in actions
against design professionals.
II. THE CASE FOR ExPERT TESTiMONY
A. History and Evolution of Expert Testimony
Prior to the emergence of trial by independent jury, courts utilized the
experience of experts in deciding issues beyond their understanding." One
method common law courts employed, involved the use of a special jury
which collectively possessed expertise relating to the particular case before
the court.74 Another method evolved after courts had begun using live witness
testimony as a means of factfinding.S Here, a court lacking expertise with
respect to a particular issue incident to the case before it, utilized an expert
to augment their understanding of the matter.76 However, this second practice
70. See, e.g., Mississippi Meadows, Inc. v. Hodson, 13 11. App. 3d 24, 26, 299 N.E.2d
359, 361 (3d Dist.) ("The duty of an architect depends upon the particular agreement he has
entered with the person who employs him and in the absence of a special agreement . . . he Is
only liable if he fails to exercise reasonable care and skill"), appeal denied, 54 Ill. 2d 597
(1973); Miller v. DeWitt, 59 Ill. App. 2d 38, 111, 208 N.E.2d 249, 284 (4th Dist. 1965) ("The
architects in contracting for their services implied ... that they would exercise and apply in
the case their skill, ability and judgment reasonably and without neglect."), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part on other grounds, 37 IIl. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
71. See supra note 2 (comparing duties of design professional to lawyers and physicians).
72. See, e.g., Crockett v. Crothers, 264 Md. 222, 285 A.2d 612 (1972) (applying general
rule in professional malpractice actions requiring expert testimony to establish standard of care
in action against contractor).
73. See Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15
HA~. L. Rav. 40 (1901). The use of some forms of expert testimony has been discovered in
cases dating back to the thirteenth century. Id. at 41 n.2. It was not until the early seventeenth
century that courts began using juries which were independent in the sense that the jurors had
no prior personal knowledge of the circumstances concerning the case before the court. Ladd,
Expert Testimony, 5 VAtD. L. Rav. 414, 414-15 (1952).
74. See Hand, supra note 73, at 40.42.
75. See C. McCo, ncK ON EVDENCE 725 (3d ed. 1984). "Though something like the jury
existed at least as early as the 1100's th[e] practice of hearing witnesses in court d[id] not
become frequent until the later 1400's." Id. (footnote omitted). Prior to the middle of the
fifteenth century, when juries began summoning witnesses, jurors shouldered the responsibility
of informing themselves of the facts in the given case before them. See Hand, supra note 71,
at 44.
76. See Hand, supra note 73, at 42-43 (court summoned "masters of grammar" to help it
interpret documents drafted in Latin).
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is distinguishable from the modern use of expert testimony. In the former,
prevalent when the trial system was inquisitorial, 77 the court itself summoned
the expert and generally deferred to his or her conclusions.7 8 In the modern
adversarial trial system, each party presents an expert whose opinions and
conclusions support his p9sition on the issue.7 9 The parties themselves control
the information which is presented at trial.
As the adversarial system developed, the practice of presenting evidence
through live witness testimony became more prevalent. Consequently, courts
designed evidentiary rules to protect jurors from misleading testimony. The
two most important rules which developed were the opinion and hearsay
rules.'* Both opinion and hearsay testimony are considered inherently un-
trustworthy. The opinion rule generally precludes a witness from testifying
as to her own subjective conclusions. 8' The witness' role is that of informing
the jury of what they knew rather than what they thought.82 The system
vests the authority to draw conclusions solely in the trier of fact. Similarly,
the hearsay rule precludes a witness from repeating, through testimony, an
out of court statement made by another.83
Expert testimony necessarily involves a certain amount of opinion, and
has long been regarded as an exception to the rule prohibiting opinion
testimony.8' This exception is justified because the expert's opinion is thought
to be grounded in a foundation of expertise regarding the matter at issue.
Moreover, although experts often rely upon out-of-court statements which,
if submitted would violate the hearsay rule, courts often regard such state-
ments as more trustworthy than the typical hearsay statement, and have
allowed their use.8 5
B. The Need For Expert Testimony in Cases Against Design
Professionals
Scientific and technological advances have led to increased complexity in
the methods of proof presented at trial; this has in turn resulted in a
77. See Ladd, supra note 73, at 414-15 (discussing issues incident to the transformation
from the inquisitorial to the adversarial trial system).
78. Id. at 415.
79. Id. (citations omitted).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Ladd, supra note 73, at 415.
83. See, e.g., Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290 (1813) (witness testimony
about out-of-court statement by another regarding plaintiff's emancipation from slavery was
inadmissable hearsay).
84. Hand, supra note 73, at 50. See also Ladd, supra note 73, at 417. Expert testimony is
sometimes regarded as an exception to the opinion rule. Id. This exception is based upon the
inability of the trier of fact to resolve certain issues without hearing from persons with special
skills, experience or scientific knowledge. Id.
85. See generally McCojaucx supra note 75, at § 244. The federal rules of evidence currently
contain so many exceptions to the hearsay rule that the exceptions may have effectively swallowed
the rule. See CLEARY & GRAH~m's HANDEOOK ON IuLINoIs EVIDENCE Art. VIII (4th ed. 1984).
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correspondingly greater need for expert testimony. 6 As the use of experts
has increased, courts have adopted rules concerning their qualifications, s7
and the basis"8 and scope 9 of their testimony to ensure that the information
86. See, e.g., Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAD. L. REv.
577, 578 (1986) (expanding many scientific... specialties allows for more sources of testimony);
Special Project, Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy, and Birth, 39
VAD. L. REv. 597, 604 (1986) ("The courts also have a duty to confront the impact of medical
technology on the law. Judges have applied old common law rules to modern prenatal tort
cases even though the modern fact situation could not have been contemplated when the rules
were developed decades or centuries earlier.").
87. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 220(a)(1) serves as an example of an expert qualification
rule:
An expert is a person who, because of education, training or experience possesses
knowledge of a specialized nature beyond that of the average person on a factual
matter material to a claim or defense in pending litigation and who may be expected
to render an opinion within his expertise at trial. He may be an employee of a
party, a party or an Independent contractor.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. I IOA, para. 220(a)(1) (1987). See also Duffy v. Midlothian Country Club,
135 II. App. 3d 429, 481 N.E.2d 1037 (1st Dist. 1985) (expert qualified solely on basis of
experience); Broussard v. Hoffman Mfg. Co., 108 Il. App. 3d 356, 438 N.E.2d 1217 (3d Dist.
1982) (trial court abused discretion when it allowed expert to testify without a basis for a
finding that his expertise was within the field about which he testified).
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides, in part: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, training or education, may tes-
tify .... ." FED. R. EvD. 702. For a general discussion of standards concerning expert quali-
fications under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, see 3 J. WEINSTEIN'S EVDENCE para. 702[04]
(1988).
88. In Wilson v. Clark, 84 I1. 2d 186, 195, 417 N.E.2d 1322, 1327 (1981), cert. denied, the
Illinois Supreme Court adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 703 to determine the basis for expert
testimony. The Rule provides, "The facts or data ... upon which an expert bases his opinion
... may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions ... upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence." FED. It. EvID. 703. In allowing
physician expert testimony which was based upon hospital records not admitted into evidence,
the Wilson Court looked to the Advisory Committee's Note, which indicates: "that the rule
applies to expert opinions based on firsthand observation, hypothetical questions, or presentation
of data outside the court." Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d at 193, 417 N.E.2d at 1327.
The court also adopted Rule 705, which provides that the "expert may testify in terms of
opinion or inference and give his reason therefore without prior disclosure of the underlying
facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to
disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination." FED. R. EVID. 705. "The advisory
committee's note to Rule 705 allows an expert opinion without disclosure of underlying facts
whether the opinion is based on firsthand or secondhand information." Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d at
194, 417 N.E.2d at 1327. See also Melecosky v. McCarthy Bros. Co., 115 Ill. 2d 209, 503
N.E.2d 355 (1987)(relying on Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rules of Evidence 703 and
705, and upholding wide trial court discretion regarding admissibility); Carlson, supra note 86,
at 577 (discussing Federal Rule 703, its requisites of admissibility, and calling for restrictions
on wholesale admissibility of underlying data based on hearsay rule and sixth amendment
confrontation right); Stalmack & Switzer, Wilson v. Clark and its Progeny : The Application
of Federal Rules 703 and 705 in Illinois, 67 Cm. B. REc. 4 (1985)(surveying Illinois decisions
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presented to the jury satisfies a modicum of authenticity. The expert's utility
in this type of case is to bridge the gap between the common experience of
the average juror and the complexities of science and technology.,* In some
cases the testimony presented by an expert is not merely useful but critical
if the jury is to truly understand the issues in the case before it.
The two rationales which underlie the requirement of expert testimony in
legal and medical malpractice actions equally support the use of expert
testimony in actions against design professionals. First, just as the complexity
of medical and legal procedures often necessitate expert testimony to facilitate
the jurors' understanding of the case, the technical aspects of design work
that apply the rules).
Presently, twenty-five states have adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 703 without change, six
states have adopted it with some changes, and one-Ohio-has adopted an inconsistent rule.
See 3 WEINSTEIN supra note 87, para 703[05], 703140-50l. Twenty-two states have adopted rules
identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 705 (or adopted with change of "court" to "judge"),
seven states have adopted rules with varying degrees of similarity, and three states have adopted
inconsistent rules. Id. at para. 705[03].
89. For example, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 220(d) concerns the scope of expert testimony
and provides in part:
To the extent that the facts known or opinions held by an expert have been developed
in discovery proceedings through interrogatories, deposition or requests to produce,
his direct testimony at trial may not be inconsistent with nor go beyond the fair
scope of the facts known or opinions disclosed in such discovery proceedings.
However, he shall not be prevented from testifying as to facts or opinions on
matters regarding which inquiry was not made in the discovery proceedings.
hl. REv. STAT. ch. I 0A, para. 220(d) (1987).
90. Courts generally allow expert testimony when the expert will appreciably help the jury
understand the particular subject at hand. Merchant's Nat'l Bank of Aurora v. Elgin, J.&
E.Ry., 49 Il. 2d 118, 121, 273 N.E.2d 809, 811 (1971) (unlike accident "reconstruction" cases,
where expert testimony is necessary because of lack of eyewitnesses, expert's opinion as to
hazard posed by railroad grade crossing was admissible because it was helpful to the jury);
Leonard v. Pitstick Dairy Lake & Park, Inc., 124 I1. App. 3d 580, 464 N.E.2d 644 (3d Dist.
1984) (relying on helpfulness standard of Fed. Rule Evid. 702 in ruling expert's testimony
regarding diving accident admissible).
"[T]he trend is to permit expert testimony In matters which are complicated and outside the
knowledge or understanding of the average person, and even as to matters of common knowledge
and understanding where difficult of comprehension and explanation. The jury may still accept
or reject such testimony." Miller v. Pillsbury, 33 Il1. 2d 514, 516, 211 N.E. 2d 733, 734 (1965),
quoted with approval in, People v. Albanese, 104 11. 2d 504, 518, 473 N.E.2d 1246, 1251
(1984) (accountant testified as expert as to murder defendant's financial condition), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1044 (1985).
"[Mlore recently the trend is to permit (expert testimony] if the expert has some special
knowledge and his testimony is of aid to the jury even though the average juror would also
have some knowledge of the subject matter." Binge v. J.J. Borders Constr. Co., 95 11. App.
3d 238, 242, 419 N.E.2d 1237, 1240 (4th Dist. 1981). However, in some cases courts prohibit
expert testimony when the subject matter of the case is clearly within the comprehension of
laymen. Generally referred to as the common knowledge bar, expert testimony is inadmissible
in such cases because it is unnecessary. Hernandez v. Power Constr. Co., 73 111. 2d 90, 382
N.E.2d 1201 (1978) (whether guardrails on scaffold would have prevented plaintiff's fall was
matter within common knowledge and not difficult to comprehend and explain, thus expert
testimony inadmissible).
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may also require expert testimony. Second, the danger that jurors will find
professional liability despite the defendant having met the standard of care,
is as present in actions against design professionals as it is in medical and
legal malpractice actions. Indeed, courts which have required expert testi-
mony in architect and engineering malpractice actions have referred to these
two rationales to justify their holdings.9'
The technical nature of the design profession and designing procedures
provided the rationale for a Kansas appellate court's requiring expert testi-
mony in a negligence action against an architect for faulty design.9 In
Seaman Unified School District v. Casson Const. Co., the defendant claimed
the architect was negligent in grading the area surrounding a gymnasium.
Although the expert testimony presented by defendants suggested that their
design and specifications complied with local architectural standards, the
trial court found professional. negligence as a matter of law.93 Borrowing
from medical malpractice actions, the defendant's appeal urged application
of a "professional community standard," and the accompanying rule re-
quiring expert testimony to establish a standard of care.9 The Kansas
appellate court noted that the purpose of requiring expert testimony was "to
educate the fact finder as to the otherwise alien terminology and technology
and thus preclude his rendering judgment on something he knows nothing
about."" Because the architectural profession and its procedures are similarly
"outside the realm of ordinary knowledge," the court approved the appli-
cation of an "architectural community standard." 96 Thus the Seaman court
recognized that architectural practices and techniques are so complex and
technical that jurors cannot ordinarily understand them without the aid of
expert testimony.
The second rationale for requiring expert testimony in design professional
malpractice actions also presents itself in medical and legal malpractice
91. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kakssabaum, Inc., 392 F.2d 472 (8th Cir.
1968) (applying Missouri law requiring expert testimony in medical malpractice actions to
negligence claim against architect); Covil v. Robert & Co. Assoc., 112 Ga. App. 163, 144
S.E.2d 450 (1965) (analogizing to medical malpractice law's requirement of expert testimony in
design negligence case).
92. Seaman Unified School Dist. v. Casson Constr. Co., 3 Kim. App. 2d 289, 594 P.2d
241 (1979).
93. Id. at 293, 594 P.2d at 245.
94. Id. at 292, 594 P.2d at 244.
95. Id. at 293, 594 P.2d at 245.
96. Id. See also Paxton v. Alameda County, 119 Cal. App. 393, 259 P.2d 934 (1953)
(approving jury instruction that the jury could consider only expert testimony in determining
whether the defendant architects were guilty of negligence); 530 East 89 Corp. v. Unger, 43
N.Y.2d 776, 373 N.E.2d 276, 402 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1977) (except where issue is within competence
of laymen, allegation of negligence must be supported by expert testimony).
The Seaman court noted that the "common knowledge exception" to the rule requiring
expert testimony would also apply to the architectural context. 3 Kan. App. 2d at 293, 594
P.2d at 245. Accord Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 98 Ne.
113, 642 P.2d 1086 (1982) (per curiam) (expert testimony required to establish surveyor's
standard of care unless conduct is within the layperson's common knowledge).
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actions. Because an injury may result despite the physician's or attorney's
exercise of reasonable care, there exists the danger that liability will be
imposed where no professional negligence occurredY Without requiring
expert testimony to establish the standard of care in a design case, fact
finders may find liability even where the architect met the professional
standard of care.9 s In design cases where expert testimony has been required,
courts have cited this danger as a factor in their decision.9 Design profes-
sionals do not guarantee a perfect result; 100 therefore, mere injury to the
plaintiff should not mandate an architect's liability. Because design profes-
sionals, like physicians and attorneys, must exercise judgment and discretion,
jurors may be unable to distinguish between a bad result and true negligence
absent the use of expert testimony.
The danger of juries unfairly imposing liability on design professionals
who exercise reasonable care is best demonstrated by illustration. A design
professional's work falls into two basic categories: design work and contract
management. A degree of professional judgment and discretion is required
for each task. For example, suppose a civil engineer is retained to design a
storm sewer system. As is typical, the client gives the design professional
certain parameters of location and cost. In developing the design for the
system the engineer must make judgments regarding its capacity to accom-
97. Cf. Scardina v. Colletti, 63 III. App. 2d 481, 488, 211 N.E.2d 762, 765 (3d Dist. 1965)
("It is not enough to prove that [defendant] made a mistake or that this treatment harmed the
plaintiff; proof of a bad result or mishap is no evidence of lack of skill or negligence.").
98. See, e.g., Seaman Unified School Dist. v. Casson Const. Co., 3 Kan. App. 2d 289,
293-94, 594 P.2d 241, 245 (1979) (trial court found architectural negligence despite the testimony
of three architects that the grading plan was in accordance with local architectural standards
and the absence of any contrary expert testimony).
99. See, e.g., Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine v. George A. Fuller Co., 719 F.2d
1335, 1346 (7th Cir. 1983) ("To properly assess [architect's] actions, the jury needed a witness
with an expertise in the field of architecture to explain the nature of the judgment calls [the
architect] made and the accuracy to be expected."). Accord H. Elton Thompson & Assoc. v.
Williams, 164 Ga. App. 571, 572, 298 S.E.2d 539, 540 (1982) ("Expert testimony is required
because the court and jury are not permitted to speculate as to the standard against which to
measure the acts of the professional in determining whether he exercised a reasonable degree
of care.").
100. See, e.g., Bates & Rogers Const. Corp. v. North Shore Sanitary Dist., 92 IIl. App. 3d
90, 414 N.E.2d 1274 (2d Dist. 1980) (engineers did not warrant the accuracy of plans and
specifications but owed only a duty of reasonable care to contractor); Mississippi Meadows,
Inc. v. Hodson, 13 III. App. 3d 24, 299 N.E.2d 359 (3d Dist. 1973) (absent special contractual
provision, architect "does not imply or guarantee a perfect plan or satisfactory result"), appeal
denied, 54 I11. 2d 597 (1973). Cf. City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420 ( Minn.
1978) (architects not liable in strict liability or implied warranty). Architects, doctors, engineers,
attorneys and others deal in somewhat inexact sciences and are continually called upon to
exercise their skilled judgment in order to anticipate and provide for random factors which are
incapable of precise measurement. The indeterminate nature of these factors makes it impossible
for professional service people to gauge them with complete accuracy in every instance. Thus,
doctors cannot promise that every operation will be successful; a lawyer can never be certain
that a contract he drafts is without latent ambiguity; and an architect cannot be certain that a
structural design will interact with natural forces as anticipated. Id. at 424.
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modate flooding. After research, the engineer designs a system able to handle
a storm the size of the largest that occurred in the previous fifty years.
Based on his best judgment and the cost and location limitations he is
working with, such a system should be adequate. However, once the hypo-
thetical storm system is built, a storm equalling the size of the largest storm
in one hundred years causes flooding.
The ability of the design professional to design a system that could have
accommodated the once-in-a-hundred-year storm is not at issue; such a
system could indeed have been created. The issue is not that the sewer system
failed to withstand the storm; rather, the issue is what basis for calculation
should the engineer, exercising reasonable care, should have used in his
design. In other words, is the engineer making an unactionable error in
judgment by using the fifty-year data or is he unreasonably committing a
breach of the design profession's standard of care?' 10 No one argues that
the system could not have been designed to withstand a once-in-a-hundred-
years storm. However, the engineer must make a judgment call based on
the available facts. Without expert testimony as to what a reasonable engineer
would have done with the available information and the cost and physical
limitations of the job, the fact finder cannot properly evaluate the engineer's
judgment.102
Evaluation of the supervisory duties of a design professional similarly
requires expert testimony. In the typical situation, the architect agrees to
supervise construction to ensure proper execution of the contract by the
contractor. The architect typically does not contract to be responsible for
the means, manner or techniques that the contractor uses, but rather agrees
only to make periodic visits to the job site. The typical general contract
requires a general contractor to provide necessary precautions for the safety
of their employees and to comply with safety ordinances, statutes, and
regulations. 03
Despite the limited character of the architect's supervisory duties, when
an employee is injured on the job site, the liability of the architect for
101. The fact that an injury occurred is not evidence that the design professional did not
meet the requisite standard of care. The plaintiff must instead show that the design professional
did not perform according to the standards set by reasonableness. See supra notes 70-72 and
accompanying text. Cf.Scardina v. Colletti, 63 I1. App. 2d 481, 488, 211 N.E.2d 762, 765 (3d
Dist. 1965) ("It is not enough to prove that [defendant] made a mistake or that this treatment
harmed the plaintiff; proof of a bad result or mishap is no evidence of lack of skill or
negligence.").
102. Cf. Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine v. George A. Fuller Co., 719 F.2d 1335,
1346 (7th Cir. 1983) ("To properly assess the [architect's] actions, the jury needed a witness
with an expertise in the field of architecture to explain the nature of the judgment calls the
[architect] made and the accuracy to be expected.").
103. The contracts at issue in Miller are a good example. The owner-architect contract defined
the architect's duty to supervise and inspect the work. The owner-contractor contract specified
that the architect could reject any work that did not conform to the specifications and could
stop the work whenever necessary to ensure compliance with the contract. See supra text
accompanying notes 36-42.
[Vol. 38:873
DESIGN PROFESSIONALS' LIABILITY
alleged improper supervision may be at issue.' °4 Because an architect is not
a safety engineer, he should not be held to the standard of care of a safety
engineer but, rather, to the standard owed by architects under similar
circumstances. The jury should consider the nature of the work performed
which led to the injury, whether or not the work performed was the type in
which an architect would be expected to be involved and whether the architect
had the duty to act to prevent the accident in question. If a plaintiff is not
required to present expert testimony as to the architect's scope of supervisory
responsibility, there is the danger that the architect will be held to a standard
reserved for the contractor.
C. Personal Observations on the Need for Expert Testimony
This writer has been involved in several design cases and has proposed
jury instructions as to the duty of a design professional and the evidence a
jury must have before it may properly find a breach of duty. These proposed
jury instructions were variations of the typical instructions used in malprac-
tice actions against physicians and attorneys. 0 In each case, the court refused
to enter the proposed instructions and instead used the standard negligence
jury instruction.1 6 The effect was that the court did not require the plaintiff
to present expert testimony that the defendant design professional had
breached the standards of his profession.
One case in particular stands out.107 A van was travelling northbound on
Interstate 294. On Bridge 441, just before the Wisconsin state line, the driver
of a van, for no apparent reason, lost control and the van crashed. While
investigating the accident, the Illinois Toll Highway Authority retained a
consulting engineering firm to evaluate the bridge and its approaches to
determine if there were any design flaws that could have caused the accident.
The engineering firm published a report which listed a number of negative
findings that could have contributed to the accident.
The plaintiff called a member of the engineering firm that compiled the
study as its expert witness. The consulting engineer testified on direct ex-
amination about the adverse findings contained in the report he had prepared.
On cross-examination, the engineer was asked if the design engineer had
failed to comply with the standards of the engineering profession when he
104. See, e.g., Miller v. DeWitt, 59 Il. App. 2d 38, 208 N.E.2d 249 (4th Dist. 1965), rev'd
on other grounds, 37 ItI. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
105. See ILLINOLS PATTERN JURY INSTRUcTIONs, Civil § 105.01 (2d ed. 1971). See also Chicago
College of Osteopathic Medicine v. George A. Fuller Co., 719 F.2d 1335, 1345-46 (7th Cir.
1983) (approving jury instruction for architect's standard of care which is based on § 105.01
of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions).
106. See ILLINOIS PATTERN JuRY INsTRucToN, Civil § 106.10.01 (2d ed. 1971).
107. James L. Cacciatore, a minor, by Frank S. Cacciatore, his father and natural guardian
v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority and Joseph K. Knoerle, Consulting Engineer, No. 71
L 4064 (1st Dist. 1971).
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designed the bridge and its approaches. The expert testified that the design
complied with all of the standards of the engineering profession.
The defendant moved for a directed verdict after presentation of the
plaintiff's evidence and again after the evidence was presented, relying for
support on the plaintiff's expert's testimony that the design engineer did not
fail to comply with engineering standards. The judge denied both motions.
The defendant then proposed a jury instruction setting forth a professional
standard similar to that of an attorney or physician. This too was denied.
As a result, the jury applied its own concept of a design professional's
standard of care and found the civil engineer liable.
One other example illustrates the need for expert testimony in establishing
the standard of care of a design professional. The lawsuit again stemmed
from an automobile accident on an Illinois highway. ,o8 This accident occurred
at a time when median dividers were installed on only a few of the highways
in the nation and none were used in Illinois. A driver lost control of her
car, crossed the center line and struck a car containing six family members.
One occupant was killed and the rest were injured. At trial, an engineering
professor from the University of Illinois testified that median dividers prob-
ably would have prevented the accident. He did not say, however, that a
reasonable engineer in Illinois exercising the requisite standard of care would
have installed the median dividers. Based on this testimony, the jury returned
a verdict and a substantial damage award against both the Illinois Toll
Highway Authority and the designers of the highway. Without any evidence
of the care a reasonable engineer would have exercised, the jury inferred
that the engineers were negligent by not installing the median dividers. Such
a result is inconsistent with legal standards of proof and fairness and could
be avoided through use of an expert testimony.
CONCLUSION
In Miller v. DeWitt,'" the Illinois Supreme Court expanded the scope of
a design professional's potential liability by imposing a duty of reasonable
care. Architects had previously been bound only by the parameters of their
contract with the client. While the Miller court expanded the architect's
duty, it failed to define or explain how a plaintiff was to establish a breach
of this new duty.
Lacking any guidance on this issue, Illinois courts have defined a design
professional's standard of care by referring to the contract between the
professional and the client." 0 However, use of the employment contract has
proved inadequate in establishing a standard of care for design profession-
108. Edward Stogensen, Administrator of the Estate of Ruth W. Stogensen, Nos. 73 L
10308, 74 L 10776 (1st Dist. 1974).
109. 37 111. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
110. See, e.g., Rosos Litho Supply Corp. v. Hansen, 123 11. App. 3d 290, 462 N.E.2d 566
(2d Dist. 1980).
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als."' The typical contract merely sets forth the particular tasks that the
design professional contracts to perform, and neither intends nor acts to
define the standard of care in performing those tasks." 2 Additionally, because
the fact finder typically is unfamiliar with the complexities of professional
design, he needs assistance in determining the standard of reasonable care.
The fact finder needs information regarding the practices of the typical
design professional in satisfying professional duties. The contract will not
provide this assistance. Thus, expert testimony is necessary to determine
whether the design professional acted negligently and unskillfully, or whether
he simply made a reasoned decision based on professional judgment.
Design professionals are just that-professionals. They possess and use
knowledge and skill that extends beyond the understanding of the average
juror. Architects and engineers who fail to exercise the profession's standard
of reasonable care and skill should be liable for malpractice, as are attorneys
and physicians. However, while legal and medical malpractice must be
established by expert testimony, under current Illinois law, design profession
negligence need not be. There seems to be no basis for the different require-
ment. Establishing the standard of reasonable care in professional design
cases is no less difficult than in legal or medical malpractice cases and, in
fact, may be more difficult.
Furthermore, due to the fall of the privity defense, design professionals
have been exposed to potential suits from a virtually limitless class of
claimants. In addition to the client, this class includes anyone who works
on the design professional's project or any member of the public who walks
into a building designed by the design professional. In contrast, attorneys
and physicians generally are liable only to their clients and to those third
parties whose cause of action relates to the professional-client relationship.
Thus, the need for expert testimony to ensure a fair result may be even
more compelling in the case of a design professional. In summary, expert
testimony is necessary to provide fact finders with an adequate understanding
of architectural and engineering design procedures and establish a fair stan-
dard of care for professional design liability.
111. See, e.g., Fence Rail Develop. Corp. v. Nelson & Assoc., 174 IUl. App. 3d 94, 528
N.E.2d 344 (2d Dist. 1988).
112. In fact, the employment contract contains an implied promise that the design professional
will exercise the standard of care exercised by a reasonable member of the profession. See
Miller v. DeWitt, 59 II1. App. 2d 38, 208 N.E.2d 249, 284 (4th Dist. 1965) ("The architects in
contracting for their services implied ... that they would exercise and apply in the case their
skill, ability and judgment reasonably and without neglect."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds, 37 III. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
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